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Risk, capital and efficiency in Chinese Banking
Abstract
We assess the relationship between bank efficiency, risk and capital for a sample of 
Chinese commercial banks employing three efficiency indexes and four risk 
indicators under a three stage least square method in a panel data framework. The
empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive and significant relationship 
between risk (loan-loss provision as a fraction to total loans or LLPTL) and efficiency 
in Chinese banking industry, while the relationship between risk (Z-score) and level 
of capitalization is negative and significant. 
Key words: efficiency, risk, capital, SUR, Chinese banks.
JEL classification: E5, E52, G21
Page 3 of 33
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
3
1. Introduction
The banking sector in China plays an important role in the development of financial 
system and the economy as a whole. Since 1997 several rounds of reforms have 
been started by Chinese government to increase bank efficiency and create a 
competitive environment in the banking sector. In other words, all the banks are 
forced to operate closer to the best practice or efficient production function. However, 
Hellmann et al. (2000) argue that increase in competition will result in greater risk-
taking behaviour due to the fact that market power of banks is reduced and their 
charter values are decreased (Salas and Saurina, 2003; Goddard and Wilson, 
2009)1. The capital adequacy plays a more and more important role for the purpose 
of counterbalance the risk.
A number of studies have investigated the impact of capital (Gropp and Heider, 
2010), operating efficiency (Casu and Girardone, 2009) on bank risk2. Furthermore, 
there are few studies assessing the relationship between risk, capital and efficiency 
for European banking area 3 . Surprisingly, there is no study examining the 
relationship between capital, risk and efficiency for Chinese banking industry. The 
investigation on the relationship between them becomes very important because of 
the financial crisis happened from 2007 in Asia4. 
Two important issues in Chinese banking industry are considered in this paper. First, 
the relationship between bank efficiency and risk is examined. The negative 
relationship is expected by the fact that lower levels of efficiency will force banks to 
boost their returns through increasing the levels of credit risk; on the other hand, 
                                                            
1  Their finding is in direct contrast with Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) who argue that the relationship between 
intense competition and increased bank’s risk taking behaviour is weak.
2  The impact of bank competition on bank risk and efficiency is analyzed by previous literature (see Boyd and 
De Nicolo, 2005; De Nicolo and Lucchetta, 2009; Casu and Girardone, 2009).
3  See Altunbas et al., 2007; Fiordelisi et al., 2011b.
4 See Festic et al., 2011.
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increases of banks' credit risk levels which involves additional costs and managerial 
efforts lead to declines in banks' levels of technical efficiency. Further, the impact of 
bank capital on the trade off between bank risk and efficiency is assessed. Banks 
tend to have lower capital levels due to the fact that higher levels of efficiency 
provide them advantage to increase their capital levels in the future. On the other 
hand, banks seem to be thinly capitalized because lower levels of efficiency induce
bank managers to balance their higher operating costs with lower volumes of funding
via expensive capital. Eventually, capital and efficiency have influences on the risk-
taking behaviour of banks. Efficient banks with higher capital levels tend to allocate 
less funds to monitor loans which results in higher levels of credit risk, while 
inefficient banks with lower capital levels tend to increase the levels of credit risk in 
order to maximize their revenues. To deal with these issues, we extend previous 
literature and assess the relationship between efficiency, risk and capital levels in 
Chinese banking sector. We use large dataset of Chinese banks over the period 
2003-2009. Our main variables of interest include different measures of bank risk, 
three different measures of bank efficiency (technical, pure technical and scale 
efficiency) and bank productivity.
According to 2009 annual report from China Banking Regulatory Commission 
(CBRC), the non-performing loan ratio of Chinese banks drops dramatically from 
nearly 20% in 2003 to 1.58% at the end of 2009, while large proportion of non-
performing loans is from the state-owned commercial banks. Further, Yao and Jiang 
(2010) suggest that the state-owned commercial banks are least efficient comparing 
to the joint-stock and city commercial banks in China over the period 1995-2008. 
Hence, it is interesting to examine whether higher risk decreases the bank efficiency,
and lower efficiency induces Chinese banks to take on higher risk.
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At the end of 2009, the capital adequacy ratio of Chinese banks reaches 11.4% 
which is higher than the international level; this higher level of capitalization is largely 
attributed to the capital injection by the government especially to the state-owned 
commercial banks. According to 2009 Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking
report (China Finance Society, 2009), during the period of 2003-2008, the Chinese 
government injects capitals to the state-owned commercial banks in different forms 
such as using the foreign reserve, writing-off the non-performing loans, etc. This free 
capital injection to the banks may reduce bank managers’ efforts which leads to a 
decline in bank efficiency and an increase in bank risk.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature on the relationship between 
bank efficiency, capital and risk in Chinese banking. First, this study includes the 
latest banking data from 2003-2009; this includes the last round of banking reform in 
China which focuses on the efficiency improvement in financial institutions. Second, 
comparing with other related studies which focus on either cost efficiency5 or profit 
efficiency6 for US or European banking industry, this is the first empirical study which
estimates the technical, pure technical, scale efficiencies and productivity index. It is 
assumed that efficiency and productivity have same relationship with bank capital 
and risk levels. In addition, we contribute to the existing literature by using different 
risk indicators. In other words, the accounting ratio which derives from banks’ 
financial statements (loan loss provision to total loans) is used as the measurement 
of bank risk. We complement this measure with three alternative risk indicators 
which are (i) volatility of ROA, (ii) volatility of ROE and (iii) Z-score. Further, we fill in 
the gap from previous empirical work (see Das and Ghosh, 2004; Altunbas et al., 
2007; Deelchand and Padgett, 2009) by controlling most comprehensive bank 
                                                            
5See Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Berger and De Young, 1997; Williams, 2004; Altunbas et al., 2007.
6 See Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti, 2006.
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specific, industry specific and macroeconomic variables, which are supposed to 
influence the efficiency/productivity-capital-risk relationship. Finally, with regards to 
the econometric modelling framework, we use the three stage least square
estimation. OLS estimation, which is employed by previous studies in this area, is 
not a robust method as it ignores the correlation of error term across equations.
Furthermore, comparing to the research undertaken by Fiordelisi et al. (2011b) for
Europe, who use the Granger causality methodology, our selected method is used to 
examine whether we can obtain similar results. Recent papers investigate the 
efficiency of Chinese banking industry (see Ariff and Can, 2008; Fu and Heffernan, 
2007; Berger et al. 2009; among others) using a standard methodology (i.e. they use 
two stages analysis under 1) DEA or SFA method to estimate efficiency and 2) OLS 
regression to investigate the determinants of efficiency).This is the first study which
examines the empirical relationship between efficiency, risk and capital in Chinese 
banking sector.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 presents the main hypotheses of interest in this study. Section 4 
describes the modelling framework on the relationship between risk, capital and 
efficiency/productivity. Section 5 discusses the data followed by section 6 which
presents the empirical results, while section 7 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. Literature review
The examinations regarding the effect of bank capital regulations on banks’ risk-
taking behaviour focused on the United States according to the early line of the 
empirical research 7 . These early studies mainly concern the issue whether the 
                                                            
7 See Peltzman, 1970; Mayne, 1972.
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existence of flat-rate deposit insurance induces banks to take on excessive risk. The 
empirical findings of these studies are doubtful about the effectiveness of banking 
capital regulations on banks’ target capital ratios. They emphasize the importance of 
controlling other factors to limit the risk-taking behaviour such as the deposit 
insurance flat fee rate or the level of nominal interest rate8.
The new wave of studies concerning the effect of bank capital regulations on banks’ 
risk-taking behaviour started after the introduction of the 1988’s Basle Accord on 
international bank capital. These studies mainly focus on the United States banking 
sector9. The findings indicate that the financing decisions made by a significant 
subset of banks are influenced by the regulatory minimum capital constraints10.
The recent empirical studies from Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Editz et al. (1998), and 
Rime (2001) suggest that capital regulations in banking have been effective in 
increasing capital ratios without shifting their portfolio and off-balance-sheet
exposure towards riskier assets. Demsetz et al. (1996) and Salas and Saurina (2003) 
report a negative effect of capital on the levels of credit risk taken by banks; this is in 
line with the moral hazard hypothesis. However, Haq and Heaney (2012) argue that 
there is evidence of U-shape relationship between bank capital and credit risk. 
Overall, there is no consensus on the issue whether the overall banking risk can be 
reduced by increasing the capital ratio.
The empirical studies concerning the effect of bank capital regulations on banks’
risk-taking behaviour and the literature dealing with bank efficiency are linked by 
Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) using a simultaneous equation framework. They provide 
                                                            
8 See Marcus, 1983.
9 For non-US countries see Barrios and Blanco (2003).
10See Wall and Peterson (1988) and Shrieves and Dahl (1990).
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evidence that efficiency and capital are relevant determinants of bank risk. According 
to Hughes and Moon (1995), efficiency is an important variable when evaluating the 
relationship between risk and capital. For instance, the efficient banks are more 
flexible in terms of their capital levels and overall risk profile, while less efficient 
banks normally are more likely to take on extra risk to compensate for the loss 
returns because of moral hazard considerations.
The Granger-causality method is employed by Berger and De Young (1997) to 
investigate the problem loans-cost efficiency-capital relationship for a sample of US 
banks over the period 1985-1994. The empirical findings suggest that declines in 
cost efficiency precede increases in problem loans especially for the banks with 
lower levels of capital; in addition, the higher levels of problem loans lead to a 
decrease in cost efficiency.
Recent studies are conducted by Williams (2004), Altunbas et al. (2007) and 
Fiordelisi et al. (2011b). Granger-causality technique is used by Williams (2004) to 
examine the relationship between problem loans, cost efficiency and capital for a 
sample of European saving banks over the period 1990-1998. He finds that the 
quality of loans is poor for the banks which are not well-managed (i.e. banks with 
lower efficiency). Further, the Seeming Unrelated Regression (SUR) is used by 
Altunbas et al. (2007) to investigate the relationship between capital, loan loss 
provision and cost efficiency for a sample of European banks over the period 1992-
2000. In contrast to William (2004), they report that banks with higher efficiency tend 
to take on higher levels of risk while less efficient banks seem to have higher capital 
levels and lower levels of credit risk. Fiordelisi et al. (2011b) use Granger-causality 
technique to assess the relationship between capital, efficiency and risk for a sample 
of European commercial banks over the period 1995-2007. The results indicate that 
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inefficient banks typically have higher risk levels and higher capital levels increase 
the bank efficiency. Overall, there is no empirical research investigating the 
relationship between risk, efficiency and capital in Chinese banking industry.
3. Main hypotheses of the relationship between capital and risk
Before introducing the empirical model, several hypotheses explaining the 
relationship between bank risk, capital and efficiency are illustrated.
Bad management hypothesis: this is labelled by Berger and De Young (1997) and 
Williams (2004) suggesting that higher costs will be incurred for the banks with lower 
levels of efficiency due to the fact that credit is inadequately monitored and operating 
expenses are not inefficiently controlled. Because of the credit, operational, market 
and reputational problems, declines in efficiency will temporarily lead to increases in 
banks’ risk. 
Bad luck hypothesis: this is put forward by Berger and De Young (1997) arguing that 
it is the external exogenous events rather than managers’ skills or their risk-taking 
appetite that lead to increases in problem loans for the banks. The increases in risk 
incur additional costs and managerial efforts. Thus, we expect that increases in 
banks’ risk precede technical efficiency and productivity declines under this 
hypothesis.
Moral hazard hypothesis: this is suggested by Jeitschko and Jeung (2005) indicating
that bank managers tend to take on more risk when the banks have lower levels of 
capital or the banks are less efficient. The moral hazard problem arising from the 
presence of informational friction and the existence of agency problem will make 
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bank managers take on higher risk. In contrast, the cost reducing practices will be 
adopted for the banks with higher levels of capital and less moral hazard incentives.
Banks are forced by the regulators to hold higher levels of capital when risk 
undertaken by banks increases; this is due to the fact that the cost for issuing fresh 
equity at short notice can be avoided by holding additional capital above the 
regulatory minimum (Peura and Keppo, 2006). On the other hand, the requirement to 
hold higher levels of capital from regulatory authority can be responded by banks 
through increasing the portfolio risk.
4. The methodological framework
We rely on the three stage least square estimation to investigate the relationship 
between bank risk, capital and efficiency/productivity as it takes into account both 
endogeneity and the cross correlation between the error terms. 
In order to disentangle the relationship between bank capital, efficiency/productivity
and risk, we estimate the following equations:
ititititititit MACROINDUSTRYBankPRODEFFCAPRISK   543210 /
(1)
ititititititit MACROINDUSTRYBANKRISKPRODEFFCAP   543210 /         (2)
ititititititit MACROINDUSTRYBANKRISKCAPPRODEFF   543210/  (3)   
Where the i subscript denotes the cross-sectional dimension across banks,and t
denotes the time dimension. RISK is the variable accounting for bank’s risk, CAP  is 
the equity to total assets ratio . PRODEFF /  is the technical, pure technical, scale 
efficiencies or Malmquist productivity index. Bank , INDUSTRY , and MACRO are the
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bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic factors influencing the 
efficiency/productivity-capital-risk relationship and it  is the random error term.
Eq. (1) tests whether efficiency or productivity and capital temporarily precede 
variations in bank risk. Eq. (2) assesses if efficiency or productivity and risk 
temporarily precede variations in bank capital, while Eq. (3) examines whether level 
of capital together with bank risk reflect the changes in bank efficiency or productivity.
We measure the individual bank risk by using the ratio between loan-loss provision 
and total loans. A higher level of this ratio indicates higher bank risk. A limitation to 
measure risk calculating from the accounting data, as suggested by Rime (2001) and 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992), is that providing the portfolio quality can be accurately 
reflected by these measures, and therefore managers are more likely to have some 
time discretion which is exercised in a way to minimize cost. They also argue that 
this measurement is quite problematic for the banks which do not have public trade 
securities (in our case, the majority of Chinese banks do not have public traded 
securities). In order to check the robustness of the results, we use three alternative 
measures of banks’ risk positions which are:(i) volatility of ROA, (ii) volatility of ROE 
and (iii) Z-score. The volatility of ROA and ROE are calculated for each bank over 
the examined period (2003-2009) while the Z-score is obtained as the ratio between 
a bank’s return on assets plus equity capital /total assets and the standard deviation 
of the return on assets. A higher figure of volatility of ROA or ROE represents higher 
risk, while higher figure of Z-score indicates that risk is low.
Capital is calculated as the ratio of book value of equity to total assets. The individual 
bank technical efficiency is measured as a maximum of a ratio of weighted outputs to 
weighted inputs, and it is calculated using the non-parametric Data Envelopment 
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Approach (DEA) CCR model11, while the pure technical and scale efficiencies are 
derived from DEA BCC model, and the productivity is measured by the Malmquist 
productivity index. Besides capital, risk and efficiency/productivity, we also control for 
comprehensive bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables; these 
variables are important in explaining the capital-risk-efficiency/productivity
relationship. 
5.  Data Description
Our banking data is composed of annual figures from 101 Chinese banks over the 
period 2003-2009 with totally over 170 observations. The banks used in this study 
are five state-owned commercial banks, twelve joint stock commercial banks and 
eighty four city commercial banks. Table 1A and Table 1B present some information 
regarding the structure of Chinese banking system, i.e. the difference among state-
owned commercial banks, joint-stock commercial banks, city commercial banks in 
terms of their ownership, business scope and their assets (percentage to the total 
banking industry assets) over the period 2003-2009. Since not all banks have 
available information for all years, we opt for an unbalanced panel not to lose 
degrees of freedom. The bank specific information is mainly obtained from 
Bankscope database maintained by Fitch/IBCA/Bureau Van Dijk, which is 
considered as the most comprehensive database for research in banking. The 
industry specific and macroeconomic variables are retrieved from the website of 
China Banking Regulatory Commission (http://www.cbrc.gov.cn) and the World Bank 
database (http://data.worldbank.org). Table 2 describes the variables used in this 
study.  
                                                            
11 Technical efficiency is estimated using four outputs (total loans, securities, total deposits and non-interest 
income) and three inputs (total cost which includes price of labour, price of funds and price of capital).
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                                                   <<Table 1---about here>>
                                                   <<Table 2—about here>>
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of all variables. The mean of LLPTL(ratio of 
loan loss provision over total loans) is 0.0092 (less than 1%) which suggests that 
through several rounds of banking reforms in China, the Chinese banks have 
increased the ability to manage the risk. The low risk of Chinese banking sector can 
also be explained by the fact that the four Asset Management Companies (AMCs) 
write-off the non-performing loans for the state-owned banks under the government 
direction. Comparing the Mean of different risk measures, the highest and lowest 
values are achieved by the Z-score and volatility of ROA, which are 44.17 and 
0.0038, respectively. In addition, according to the Min and Max values, the difference 
of Z-score in different years among banks is huge. The difference of capital positions
among banks in different years is relatively large with lowest value of -14 and highest 
value of 31. According to the values of the standard deviation, there is a substantial 
difference of productivity than efficiency in Chinese banking sector over the 
examined period. Correlation among the variables is usually negligible suggesting 
that our models are unlikely to suffer from major multicollinearity problems 12 .
Furthermore, the expected impacts of comprehensive variables on risk, capital, 
efficiency/productivity are described in Table 4.
<<Table 3---about here>>
<<Table 4—about here>>
                                                            
12 Estimated correlations coefficients are available upon request from the authors.
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6. Empirical results and discussion
Empirical results derived from the simultaneous estimations using technical 
efficiency as the dependent variable are reported in Table 5. The empirical results 
show that there is a negative and significant relationship between risk (Z-score) and 
capitalization. In the context of the Chinese banking industry, the finding can be 
explained by the fact that banks with higher levels of capital are more capable of 
absorbing the losses accumulated from non-performing loans which reduces the risk, 
while banks with higher levels of risk need larger amounts of capital to compensate 
the losses which leads to lower levels of capital. We further report that the 
relationship between risk (LLPTL) and technical efficiency is significant and positive. 
In order to minimize the input invested in producing certain amount of output 
(achieving higher technical efficiency), Chinese banks reduce their efforts to check 
the credit and monitor the loans which leads to higher risk. On the other hand, higher 
levels of risk because of lacking of monitoring and screening increase the volumes of 
loans generated by Chinese banks which precedes increases in technical efficiency.
We also find that size and technical efficiency are positively related in Chinese 
banking industry. The state-owned commercial banks have larger size in terms of 
total assets; they have comprehensive branches around the country and the amount 
and variety of business engaged by them are substantially more than joint-stock and 
city commercial banks. Also, they have the ability and advantage to reduce the costs
from economies of scale and scope. In other words, they can generate the same 
amount of outputs using fewer inputs which leads to higher efficiency. Furthermore, 
we suggest that liquidity, taxation and labour productivity are significantly and 
negatively related to technical efficiency of Chinese banks. Chinese banks with 
higher volumes of loans need more deposits to deal with the daily withdraws from 
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customers; the increase in the deposit interest rate (in order to attract more 
depositors) increases the price of funds which leads to a decline in bank efficiency. 
Higher taxation paid by banks reduces the managers’ incentives and efforts to 
control the costs which leads to increases in the input expenses and decreases in
bank efficiency. The labours with higher productivity require higher wages or salaries, 
the resulted increase in the price of labour increases the input cost in banking 
operating which precedes a decline in bank technical efficiency in China. In terms of 
the industry-specific variables, the results indicate that more concentrated banking 
market precedes a decrease in technical efficiency of Chinese banking industry. That 
is, in a highly concentrated market, bank managers have less incentive to improve 
the efficiency. Furthermore, when risk is measured by LLPTL, volatility of ROA and 
ROE, the results indicate that banks with larger size (in terms of total assets) have 
lower capital positions, while banks in a highly concentrated and developed banking 
sector are normally better capitalized. As reported previously, higher concentrated 
banking market leads to a decline in bank efficiency. Hence, bank managers
normally balance the higher cos s with higher levels of capitalization because the 
Chinese government injects capitals to the banks for free.
<<Table 5---about here>>
Table 6 reports the results of the relationship between bank capital, pure technical 
efficiency and risk in Chinese banking. The results show that most of the variables 
are consistent comparing with the findings in Table 5. However, when the 
relationship between capital, risk and scale efficiency is examined (Table 7), the 
findings show that liquidity has a positive impact on the level of capitalization of 
Chinese banks. Furthermore, bank concentration and development of banking 
market are positively related to bank capital (when risk is measured by LLPTL, 
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volatility of ROA and volatility of ROE). Although the risk management ability has 
improved significantly, the volume of non-performing loans is still higher especially 
for the state-owned commercial banks due to the fact the government still has 
influence or controls on the banks’ operation especially the credit allocation. Larger
volumes of loans are allocated to the state-owned enterprises with lower profitability 
and lower probability of loan repayment. Capital works as a cushion to absorb these
losses. In other words, more loans made by Chinese banks (lower liquidity) 
decreases the levels of capitalization. In a higher concentrated and developed
banking market where competition is relatively lower, Chinese banks should take on 
higher risk (higher LLPTL) in order to obtain higher profits which is in line with the 
competition-stability hypothesis; Chinese government may inject capitals to the 
banks to counterbalance the risk. 
<<Table 6---about here>>
<<Table 7---about here>>
In addition, Table 8 shows the results using the Malmquist productivity index, instead 
of efficiency, as an explanatory variable. We find that there is a significant and 
positive relationship between liquidity and capital which confirms our previous finding. 
This is also in line with Altunbas et al. (2007) for European banking.
In terms of the industry specific variables, we find a significant and positive 
relationship between concentration and capital (when risk is measured by LLPTL, 
volatility of ROA and volatility of ROE) which is in line with Fiordelisi et al. (2011b) for 
Europe. However, Fiordelisi et al. (2011a) find that there is no effect of concentration 
on capital in terms of a large sample of investment banks in ten large developed 
countries. Furthermore, we find that higher developed banking sector improves the 
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bank productivity in China, however, Chinese bank productivity is lower in a higher 
developed stock market. Higher developed banking sector indicates that there is a 
higher demand for banking services, and therefore, increases in the volumes of 
customers improve the bank productivity. Whereas the developed stock market 
provides more opportunities for investors to obtain funds from stock market rather 
than banks, decreases in the numbers of customers to banks make some of the 
staffs redundant, thus decreases the bank productivity. Finally, in terms of the 
macroeconomic environment, annual inflation and GDP growth rates are found to be 
positively related to Chinese bank productivity. Technological improvement, one 
source of GDP growth, improves the production method in banking operation which 
precedes an increase in bank productivity. The positive impact of inflation on bank 
productivity can be explained by the fact that in the inflation environment, the amount 
of depositors will decrease because of the erosion on the value of money. In order to 
engage in more activities to obtain higher profits and have stronger competitive 
power, the bank managers tend to contribute more efforts to increase the bank 
productivity.
<<Table 8---about here>>
7.  Summary and Conclusion
In this paper, we assess the relationship between bank efficiency/productivity, capital 
and risk for Chinese commercial banking industry. We look into this relationship 
deeply and differently by including three different indexes of efficiency, productivity 
and four indicators of bank risk. We contribute to the empirical literature by using 
Chinese banking data over 2003-2009, the period of which focuses on creating a 
more competitive environment and increasing bank efficiency.
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The empirical evidence suggests that there is a significant and negative relationship 
between risk (Z-score) and capitalization, while the relationship between risk (LLPTL) 
and technical/pure technical efficiency of Chinese banks is significant and positive. In 
terms of the bank-specific variables, we find that bigger banks (in terms of total 
assets) have higher technical and pure technical efficiencies, while Chinese banks 
with higher liquidity levels have lower technical and pure technical efficiencies. 
Furthermore, in a higher concentrated banking market, the technical and pure 
technical efficiencies of Chinese banks are lower. With regards to the relationship 
between risk, capital and bank productivity, the results suggest that banks with 
higher liquidity levels are more capitalized. Finally, we report that inflation and GDP 
growth rates have positive impacts on bank productivity in China.
In addition to the gains from extending previous work on the relationship between 
efficiency, risk and capital, we strongly believe that our empirical results may be 
helpful for the Chinese government and banking regulatory authority to make 
relevant policies. In particular, Chinese banks should be encouraged to engage in 
lending activities with higher risk, and help increase competition (decrease 
concentration) in banking sector. Finally, Chinese banking sector should be further 
developed and stock market should be better controlled.
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Appendix A
A.1. Efficiency estimation
The efficiency estimates in this study have been obtained using the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA, which is originated by Charnes, Cooper and 
Rhodes (1978), known as CCR model, is a linear programming technique. The CCR 
model measures the efficiency of each Decision Making Units (DMUs) that is 
obtained as a maximum of a ratio of weighted outputs to weighted inputs. This 
denotes that the less input invested in producing the given output, the more efficient 
of the production. The CCR model presupposes that there is no significant 
relationship between the scale of operation and efficiency by assuming Constant 
Return to Scale (CRS). The CRS assumption is only suitable when all DMUs are 
operating at an optimal scale. 
Banker et al. (1984) extend the CCR model by relaxing the CRS assumption. The
resulting “BCC” model was used to assess the efficiency of DMUs characterized by 
Variable Return to Scale (VRS). The VRS assumption provides the measurement of 
purely technical efficiency (PTE), which is the measurement of technical efficiency 
devoid of the scale efficiency effect. The CCR model can be expressed as follow:
0
,0
,0
subject to
,min ,







Xx
Yy
i
i
(1)
Where   is a scalar and   is a N?1 vector of constants, Y represents all input and 
output data for N firms, ix are individual inputs and iy the outputs for the i th firm. The 
Page 20 of 33
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
20
efficiency score for each DMU is given by  ; it takes a value between 0 and 1, which 
indicates the efficiency level.
The CRS linear programming problem can be easily modified to account for VRS by 
adding the convexity constraint, N1’λ=1, to provide:
0
1'1
,0
,0
subject to
,min ,









N
Xx
Yy
i
i
(2)
Where N1 is an N?1 vector of ones. This approach forms a convex hull of 
intersecting plans which envelop the data points more tightly than the CRS conical 
hull; this provides pure technical efficiency scores which are greater than or equal to 
those obtained using the CRS model. If the efficiency scores obtained from CRS 
model and VRS model are different, this indicates that the DMU has scale 
inefficiency, and that the scale inefficiency can be calculated from the difference 
between the VRS technical efficiency (TE) score and the CRS TE score. The 
relationship between CRS and VRS is given below:
SETETE VRSCRS                                                                                                  (3)
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A.2. The measurement of productivity in the Chinese banking industry
The output-oriented Malmquist method13 defined by Caves et al. (1982) is used to 
derive the TFP growth and it is estimated using DEA by Fare et al. (1994). Let us 
assume that there are n observations using m inputs to produce L outputs. 
Denote   mnm
nnn RXXXX  )......,( 21 ,      Lnlnnn RYYYY  )........,( 21
The production technology can be written as:
 YcanproduceXXYF :),( which describes the set of feasible input-output vectors.
The input sets of production technology can be written as:
}),(:{)( FXYXYPT  which describe the sets of input vectors that are feasible for 
each output vector.
The output Malmquist TFP productivity index14 can then be expressed as:
),,,( ttsso yxyxM =
2
1
),(
),(
),(
),(






sst
o
ttt
o
sss
o
tts
o
yxD
yxD
yxD
yxD
                                                                          (4)
where 0M measures the productivity change between period s and t; 
),( ttso yxD represents the distance from the period t observation to the period s
technology. 10 M indicates positive TFP growth from period s to period t, while 
10 M indicates a decline and 10 M  indicates constant TFP growth.
                                                            
13 We employ the output-oriented Malmquist index due to the fact that the regulators are more concerned about 
the bank’s output (see Delis et al., 2011).
14 To estimate the bank productivity using the Malmquist index, we use the same inputs and outputs as discussed 
earlier in the paper (see footnote 11).
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Table 1A. the difference among state-owned, joint-stock and city commercial banks in China
Banks Ownership and business scope
State-owned commercial banks Fully central government owned (finance the 
big state-owned enterprises)
Joint-stock commercial banks Local government as well as private and 
state-owned enterprises (their businesses 
mainly oriented to the small and medium size 
enterprises).
City commercial banks Local government, enterprises and residents
(most of them focus their businesses in the 
city where they were founded).
Table 1B. The assets of different ownerships of banks over the period 2003-2009 (RMB: 
Billion)
Years/Banks State-owned 
commercial 
banks(percentage to 
the total banking 
industry assets)
Joint-stock 
commercial 
banks(percentage to 
the total banking 
industry assets)
City commercial 
banks(percentage to 
the total banking 
industry assets)
2003 16051.17(58%) 2959.86(10.7%) 1462.17(5.3%)
2004 17981.67(57%) 3647.6(11.5%) 1705.63(5.4%)
2005 21005(56%) 4465.49(11.9%) 2036.69(5.4%)
2006 24236.35(55%) 5444.59(12.4%) 2593.79(5.9%)
2007 28007.09(53%) 7249.4(13.8%) 3340.48(6.4%)
2008 31835.8(51%) 8809.5(14.1%) 4131.97(6.6%)
2009 40089.02(50.9%) 11784.98(15%) 5680.01(7.2%)
Source: China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC), 2009.
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Table 2. Description of variables used in the study
 Variables Acronym Definition
Risk LLPTL Loan-loss provision as a fraction 
to total loans
Volatility of ROA Standard deviation of ROA
Volatility of ROE Standard deviation of ROE
Z-score Ratio between a bank’s return on 
assets plus equity capital/total 
assets and the standard 
deviation of the return on assets
EFF TE Technical efficiency
Capital CAP Book value of capital to total 
assets
Bank-specific variables
Profitability ROA Return on Assets
Size SIZE Logarithm of total assets
Loan to total assets Liquidity Ratio of loan to total assets
Tax to pre-tax profit TAXATION Rtio of tax to pre-tax profit
Non-traditional activity OBSOTA Ratio of off-balnce-sheet items to 
total assets
Labour LP Ratio of gross total revenue to 
number of employees
Industry specific variables
Concentration C(3) The ratio of large three banks in 
terms of total assets to the total 
assets of the banking industry
Banking sector development BSD The ratio of banking industry 
assets over GDP
Stock market development SMD Ratio of stock market 
capitalization over GDP
Macroeconomics
Inflation IR Annual inflation rate
GDP growth GDPG Annual GDP growth rate
Notes (Sources of the above data):
 Bank-specific variables (includes risk and capital) are from Bankscope
 Indestry-specific variables are from China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC, 2009)
 Macroeconomic variables are from World bank database
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of all variables
Variables Mean S.D Min Max
Risk(LLPTL) 0.0092 0.0067 -0.0019 0.042
Volativity of 
ROA
0.0038 0.0038 0 0.029
Volatility of ROE 0.11 0.5 0 5.12
Z-score 44.17 245.52 -5184.29 475
Efficiency 0.89 0.05 0.733 1
Productivity 1.006 1.1 0.579 1.699
Capital 5.11 2.97 -14 31
ROA 0.007 0.006 -0.04 0.089
Size 4.67 0.95 0.71 7.07
Liquidity 53.39 9.35 17.97 83.25
Taxation 0.41 0.37 -4.56 3.18
Off-balance-
activity
0.199 0.11 0.00014 0.67
Labour 
productivity
0.008 0.004 3.00e-06 0.019
Concentration 14.54 1.95 10.19 16.29
Banking sector 
development
51.98 15.49 16.86 63
Stock market 
development
77 49.47 31.9 184.1
Inflation 2.5 2.17 -0.77 5.86
GDP growth 11 1.72 9.1 14.2
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Table 4. Expectation of the impacts of comprehensive variables on risk, capital, 
efficiency/productivity in Chinese banking industry
Risk Capital Efficiency/productivity
Profitability - - +
Size + - +
Liquidity - - -
Taxation + + -
Non-traditional 
activity
- + +
Labour productivity - - +
Concentration - - +
Banking sector 
development
+ + ?
Stock market 
development
+ + +
inflation - - -
GDP growth - - +
Notes: “-”represents negative impact, “+”represents positive impact, and “?”
represents no priori expectation.
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Table 5. Three stage least square estimation for the relationship between bank capital, technical efficiency and risk-taking in the Chinese banking
Model where risk=Z-score Model where risk=LLPTL Model where risk=VOA Model where risk=VOE
Eq.1
Y=Z-
score
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=efficiency
Eq.1
Y=LLPTL
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=efficiency
Eq.1
Y=VOA
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=efficiency
Eq.1
Y=VOE
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=efficiency
risk 0.001***
(8.07)
-1.24e-06
(-0.35)
-37.42
(-0.93)
1.42**
(2.28)
46.66
(1.10)
0.123
(0.18)
-0.32
(-1.04)
0.0006
(0.13)
efficiency -691.7
(-0.4)
4.82
(1.05)
0.02**
(2.28)
7.57
(1.59)
0.002
(0.18)
6.66
(1.43)
0.147
(0.13)
6.79
(1.45)
cap 241***
(8.07)
0.002
(1.05)
-0.0001
(-0.93)
0.002
(1.59)
0.0001
(1.10)
0.002
(1.43)
-0.019
(-1.04)
0.002
(1.45)
ROA -
15656
(-0.84)
-6.18
(-0.14)
0.32
(0.41)
-0.156*
(-1.92)
-30.83
(-0.71)
0.251
(0.37)
0.06
(0.81)
-27.12
(-0.64)
-0.03
(-0.04)
-8.35
(-0.80)
-26.96
(-0.63)
-0.014
(-0.02)
Size -257**
(-2.13)
-0.38
(-1.35)
0.032***
(7.23)
-0.002***
(-4.15)
-1.14***
(-4.10)
0.032***
(8.09)
-0.001**
(-2.23)
-1.02***
(-3.80)
0.03***
(7.69)
0.03
(0.45)
-1.06***
(-4.03)
0.03***
(7.78)
Liquidity 12.99
(0.82)
-0.09**
(-2.48)
-0.002***
(-2.85)
0.0002**
(2.37)
-0.039
(-1.14)
-0.002***
(-3.95)
-0.0001*
(-1.66)
-0.04
(-1.18)
-0.002***
(-3.58)
-0.001
(-0.15)
-0.045
(-1.34)
-0.002***
(-3.63)
Taxation 76.68
(0.21)
-0.902
(-1.07)
-0.05***
(-3.22)
0.004**
(2.42)
-0.756
(-0.85)
-0.04***
(-3.04)
-0.0006
(-0.39)
-0.903
(-1.04)
-0.04***
(-2.68)
0.02
(0.09)
-0.93
(-1.06)
-0.037***
(-2.69)
OBSOTA 307.2
(0.28)
3.75
(1.47)
0.05
(1.08)
-0.0005
(-0.12)
4.02*
(1.73)
0.014
(0.37)
0.0096**
(2.33)
3.62
(1.54)
0.01
(0.27)
0.154
(0.27)
4.12*
(1.79)
0.011
(0.31)
LP -
103***
(-4.01)
94.09
(1.51)
-2.03*
(-1.79)
-0.087
(-0.77)
-34.18
(-0.57)
-1.61*
(-1.72)
0.012
(0.12)
-34.42
(-0.58)
-1.81*
(-1.93)
15.21
(1.04)
-29.03
(-0.49)
-1.82*
(-1.94)
C(3) -73.13
(-0.42)
0.57
(1.43)
-0.019***
(-2.60)
0.003***
(3.50)
0.977**
(2.31)
-0.022***
(-3.30)
-0.0007
(-0.91)
0.902**
(2.21)
-0.018***
(-2.80)
0.054
(0.53)
0.89**
(2.18)
-0.018***
(-2.83)
BSD 8771**
(2.03)
7.64
(0.75)
-0.13
(-0.72)
0.011
(0.56)
26.18**
(2.53)
-0.19
(-1.18)
-0.0055
(-0.30)
26.12**
(2.54)
-0.195
(-1.17)
1.21
(0.47)
26.26**
(2.55)
-0.196
(-1.18)
SMD -6.06
(-0.75)
-0.005
(-0.24)
-0.0004
(-1.24)
0.00006
(1.47)
-0.004
(-0.19)
-0.0004
(-1.24)
-0.00002
(-0.62)
-0.005
(-0.25)
-0.0003
(-0.90)
0.001
(0.27)
-0.006
(-0.29)
-0.0003
(-0.91)
IR 350**
(1.97)
-0.101
(-0.24)
0.002
(0.32)
-0.0005
(-0.62)
0.396
(0.91)
0.001
(0.13)
0.0002
(0.26)
0.414
(0.96)
-0.0003
(-0.04)
0.022
(0.20)
0.43
(1.00)
-0.0002
(-0.04)
GDPG 307.65
(1.13)
-0.103
(-0.16)
0.02
(1.53)
-0.003**
(-2.13)
-0.08
(-0.12)
0.02*
(1.77)
0.0007
(0.56)
-0.0005
(-0.00)
0.014
(1.35)
-0.036
(-0.22)
0.02
(0.03)
0.014
(1.36)
Const. -
18319
(-1.54)
-18.18
(-0.65)
1.23**
(2.49)
-0.042
(-0.78)
-61.77**
(-2.18)
1.39***
(3.17)
0.026
(0.52)
61.55**
(-2.18)
1.4***
(3.15)
-3.16
(-0.45)
-61.36**
(-2.18)
1.41***
(3.17)
Obs. 142 142 142 175 175 175 177 177 177 177 177 177
Chi2 177*** 138.32*** 106.86*** 57.04*** 57.72*** 118.62*** 22.55** 60.22*** 112.55*** 7.69 60.05*** 112.52***
Notes: T-statistics in ( ); *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
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Table 6. Three stage least square estimation for the relationship between bank capital, pure technical efficiency and risk-taking in the Chinese 
banking
Model where risk=Z-score Model where risk=LLPTL Model where risk=VOA Model where risk=VOE
Eq.1
Y=Z-
score
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=efficiency
Eq.1
Y=LLPTL
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=efficiency
Eq.1
Y=VOA
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=efficiency
Eq.1
Y=VOE
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=efficiency
risk 0.001***
(8.09)
-4.31e-07
(-0.13)
-38.93
(-0.98)
1.17**
(2.03)
45.19
(1.07)
0.127
(0.20)
-0.307
(-1.01)
-0.001
(-0.21)
efficiency -278.3
(-0.13)
5.93
(1.22)
0.02**
(2.03)
9.5*
(1.87)
0.002
(0.20)
8.58*
(1.72)
-0.257
(-0.21)
8.6
(1.72)
cap 243***
(8.09)
0.002
(1.22)
-0.0001
(-0.98)
0.002*
(1.87)
0.0001
(1.07)
0.002*
(1.72)
-0.02
(-1.01)
0.002*
(1.72)
ROA -
14659
(-0.79)
-7.77
(-0.18)
0.45
(0.62)
-0.16**
(-1.97)
-31.08
(-0.72)
0.32
(0.51)
0.06
(0.79)
-26.82
(-0.63)
0.084
(0.13)
-8.36
(-0.80)
-26.72
(-0.63)
0.084
(0.13)
Size -277**
(-2.31)
-0.4
(-1.43)
0.03***
(7.11)
-0.002***
(-4.01)
-1.18***
(-4.30)
0.03***
(7.99)
-0.001**
(-2.24)
-1.06***
(-3.99)
0.028***
(7.68)
0.042
(0.63)
-1.10***
(-4.20)
0.027***
(7.77)
Liquidity 13.36
(0.85)
-0.09**
(-2.51)
-0.001**
(-2.43)
0.0001**
(2.27)
-0.039
(-1.15)
-0.002***
(-3.49)
-0.0001*
(-1.67)
-0.04
(-1.19)
-0.002***
(-3.16)
-0.002
(-0.23)
-0.045
(-1.35)
-0.002***
(-3.22)
Taxation 87.34
(0.24)
-0.86
(-1.03)
-0.045
(-3.23)
0.004**
(2.38)
-0.71
(-0.80)
-0.04***
(-3.07)
-0.0006
(-0.38)
-0.86
(-0.99)
-0.036***
(-2.76)
0.005
(0.02)
-0.885
(-1.02)
-0.04***
(-2.77)
OBSOTA 393.06
(0.36)
3.72
(1.47)
0.04
(0.88)
-0.0006
(-0.13)
4.2*
(1.83)
0.006
(0.16)
0.009**
(2.31)
3.82
(1.64)
0.002
(0.06)
0.151
(0.27)
4.3*
(1.88)
0.004
(0.10)
LP -
104***
(-4.04)
95.6
(1.54)
-1.89*
(-1.80)
-0.09
(-0.80)
-34.85
(-0.58)
-1.42
(-1.63)
0.014
(0.14)
-34.77
(-0.59)
-1.59*
(-1.84)
14.61
(1.01)
-29.65
(-0.50)
-1.58*
(-1.81)
C(3) -66.68
(-0.39)
0.57
(1.45)
-0.02**
(-2.36)
0.003***
(3.43)
0.99**
(2.35)
-0.02***
(-3.06)
-0.0007
(-0.91)
0.91**
(2.24)
-0.02***
(-2.62)
0.047
(0.47)
0.896***
(2.21)
-0.02***
(-2.63)
BSD 8892**
(2.05)
7.81
(0.77)
-0.14
(-0.80)
0.011
(0.54)
26.42*
(2.56)
0.18
(-1.18)
-0.005
(-0.30)
26.38*
(2.58)
-0.18
(-1.18)
1.13
(0.44)
26.5*
(2.59)
-0.18
(-1.18)
SMD -5.77
(-0.71)
-0.005
(-0.24)
-0.0004
(-1.11)
0.0001
(1.44)
-0.003
(-0.16)
-0.0003
(-1.16)
-0.00002
(-0.63)
-0.005
(-0.23)
-0.0002
(-0.85)
0.001
(0.25)
-0.005
(-0.26)
-0.0003
(-0.86)
IR 347.5*
(1.96)
-0.094
(-0.23)
0.001
(0.14)
-0.0005
(-0.60)
0.4
(0.92)
-0.0001
(-0.01)
0.0002
(0.27)
0.417
(0.97)
-0.001
(-0.16)
0.022
(0.20)
0.43
(1.01)
-0.001
(-0.15)
GDPG 297.63
(1.10)
-0.1
(-0.16)
0.014
(1.30)
-0.003**
(-2.08)
-0.097
(-0.14)
0.016
(1.58)
0.0007
(0.56)
-0.012
(-0.02)
0.012
(1.20)
-0.03
(-0.19)
0.008
(0.01)
0.012
(1.21)
Const. -
18874
(-1.58)
-19.61
(-0.71)
1.24***
(2.68)
-0.04
(-0.75)
-63.98**
(-2.26)
1.36***
(3.33)
0.026
(0.51)
-63.77**
(-2.27)
1.37***
(3.33)
-2.61
(-0.37)
-63.46**
(-2.26)
1.37***
(3.33)
Obs. 143 143 143 176 176 176 178 178 178 178 178 178
Chi2 186*** 144*** 100.91*** 56.50*** 61.81*** 113.8*** 22.45** 64.15*** 109.45*** 7.77 63.98*** 109.46***
Notes: T-statistics in ( ); *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
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Table 7. Three stage least square estimation for the relationship between bank capital, scale efficiency and risk-taking in Chinese banking
Model where risk=Z-score Model where risk=LLPTL Model where risk=VOA Model where risk=VOE
Eq.1
Y=Z-score
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=efficiency
Eq.1
Y=LLPTL
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=efficiency
Eq.1
Y=VOA
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=efficiency
Eq.1
Y=VOE
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=efficiency
risk 0.001***
(8.08)
-9.33e-06
(-1.38)
-26.28
(-0.66)
0.89
(0.81)
48.14
(1.13)
0.55
(0.46)
-0.313
(-1.02)
0.003
(0.32)
eff -1408
(-1.38)
0.4
(0.17)
0.004
(0.81)
-2.17
(-0.80)
0.002
(0.46)
-2.36
(-0.88)
0.21
(0.32)
-2.19
(-0.82)
cap 239.56***
(8.08)
0.0005
(0.17)
-0.0001
(-0.66)
-0.002
(-0.80)
0.0001
(1.13)
-0.002
(-0.88)
-0.02
(-1.02)
-0.002
(-0.82)
ROA -16188
(-0.88)
-4.68
(-0.11)
-1.13
(-0.75)
-0.15*
(-1.88)
-29.54
(-0.68)
-0.497
(-0.41)
0.06
(0.81)
-27.98
(-0.65)
-0.66
(-0.55)
-8.26
(-0.79)
-27.67
(-0.65)
-0.61
(-0.51)
Size -274.14***
(-2.69)
-0.23
(-0.94)
0.005
(0.60)
-0.002***
(-3.47)
-0.91***
(-3.77)
0.007
(0.94)
-0.001**
(-2.49)
-0.82***
(-3.51)
0.006
(0.82)
0.03
(0.59)
-0.87***
(-3.76)
0.005
(0.73)
Liquid
ity
13.7
(0.90)
-0.099***
(-2.84)
0.0001
(0.06)
0.0001*
(1.84)
-0.06*
(-1.71)
-0.0002
(-0.24)
-0.0001*
(-1.76)
-0.05*
(-1.65)
-0.0001
(-0.07)
-0.001
(-0.19)
-0.06*
(-1.83)
-0.0001
(-0.13)
Taxati
on
105.92
(0.30)
-1.14
(-1.41)
0.005
(0.19)
0.003**
(1.98)
-1.09
(-1.25)
0.002
(0.10)
-0.001
(-0.43)
-1.16
(-1.36)
0.0054
(0.23)
0.013
(0.06)
-1.19
(-1.40)
0.005
(0.21)
OBS
OTA
276.36
(0.25)
4.01
(1.58)
-0.072
(-0.81)
-0.0002
(-0.05)
4.18*
(1.80)
-0.063
(-0.96)
0.0096**
(2.34)
3.73
(1.59)
-0.07
(-1.03)
0.16
(0.29)
4.24*
(1.84)
-0.06
(-0.98)
LP -101152***
(-4.01)
85.04
(1.38)
0.45
(0.21)
-0.12
(-1.10)
-47.19
(-0.79)
0.89
(0.53)
0.0099
(0.10)
-47.28
(-0.81)
0.75
(0.46)
14.86
(1.03)
-42.21
(-0.72)
0.72
(0.44)
C(3) -65.04
(-0.39)
0.49
(1.24)
-0.003
(-0.18)
0.002***
(3.07)
0.82**
(1.97)
-0.004
(-0.31)
-0.001
(-0.97)
0.78*
(1.95)
-0.001
(-0.10)
0.052
(0.52)
0.77*
(1.91)
-0.002
(-0.15)
BSD 8842**
(2.06)
7.05
(0.69)
0.02
(0.06)
0.007
(0.37)
24.99**
(2.41)
-0.047
(-0.16)
-0.0057
(-0.31)
25.02**
(2.43)
-0.036
(-0.12)
1.19
(0.47)
25.15**
(2.44)
-0.04
(-0.15)
SMD -5.88
(-0.74)
-0.007
(-0.35)
-0.0002
(-0.30)
0.00005
(1.30)
-0.007
(-0.35)
-0.0002
(-0.33)
-0.00002
(-0.64)
-0.007
(-0.36)
-0.0001
(-0.24)
0.001
(0.27)
-0.008
(-0.39)
-0.0001
(-0.27)
IR 349.78**
(1.98)
-0.09
(-0.22)
0.005
(0.34)
-0.0005
(-0.62)
0.41
(0.94)
0.003
(0.22)
0.0002
(0.26)
0.42
(0.97)
0.002
(0.18)
0.021
(0.20)
0.43
(1.01)
0.002
(0.18)
GDP
G
301.16
(1.12)
-0.02
(-0.03)
0.008
(0.36)
-0.002*
(-1.89)
0.07
(0.10)
0.008
(0.40)
0.0007
(0.57)
0.103
(0.16)
0.005
(0.28)
-0.035
(-0.22)
0.12
(0.19)
0.006
(0.31)
Const -17719
(-1.53)
-12.74
(-0.47)
0.89
(0.94)
-0.02
(-0.35)
-49.61*
(-1.77)
1.04
(1.33)
0.026
(0.53)
-50.25*
(-1.81)
1.01
(1.30)
-3.17
(-0.46)
-50.06*
(-1.80)
1.04
(1.33)
Obs. 143 143 143 176 176 176 178 178 178 178 178 178
Chi2 190.50*** 141.46*** 10.72 52*** 58.05*** 9.91 22.65** 61.23*** 9.52 7.83 60.92*** 9.41
Notes: T-statistics in ( ); *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
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Table 8. Three stage least square estimation for the relationship between bank capital, productivity and risk-taking in Chinese banking
Model where risk=Z-score Model where risk=LLPTL Model where risk=VOA Model where risk=VOE
Eq.1
Y=Z-score
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=productivity
Eq.1
Y=LLPTL
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=productivity
Eq.1
Y=VOA
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=productivity
Eq.1
Y=VOE
Eq.2
Y=capital
Eq.3
Y=productivity
risk 0.001***
(8.07)
0.00001*
(1.78)
34.76
(0.56)
1.1
(0.58)
11.71
(0.23)
1.09
(0.70)
-0.34
(-1.48)
0.002
(0.23)
prod 2562.23*
(1.78)
-2.34
(-0.87)
0.003
(0.58)
1.54
(0.45)
0.005
(0.70)
1.59
(0.47)
0.34
(0.23)
1.73
(0.52)
cap 358.53***
(8.07)
-0.004
(-0.87)
0.001
(0.56)
0.001
(0.45)
0.00005
(0.23)
0.001
(0.47)
-0.07
(-1.48)
0.002
(0.52)
ROA -40481
(-0.64)
177.47
(1.55)
-0.14
(-0.03)
-1.27***
(-5.68)
190.58
(1.23)
-0.67
(-0.14)
1.19***
(4.51)
136.22
(0.95)
-3.53
(-0.81)
-93.23
(-1.64)
114.88
(0.88)
-2.09
(-0.52)
Size -407.3***
(-3.39)
0.26
(1.09)
0.009
(0.93)
-0.0001
(-0.35)
-0.33
(-1.29)
0.005
(0.60)
-0.002***
(-4.64)
-0.31
(-1.12)
0.007
(0.86)
0.03
(0.27)
-0.32
(-1.29)
0.005
(0.61)
Liquid
ity
21.42
(1.04)
-0.095***
(-2.60)
0.0003
(0.18)
0.0003
(0.43)
-0.11**
(-2.33)
0.001
(0.49)
-0.0003***
(-3.13)
-0.1**
(-2.13)
0.001
(0.70)
-0.03
(-1.26)
-0.11**
(-2.48)
0.001
(0.54)
Taxati
on
1772
(1.41)
0.45
(0.19)
-0.087
(-0.92)
-0.005
(-1.22)
2.99
(1.11)
-0.085
(-1.04)
0.013**
(2.33)
2.69
(0.98)
-0.106
(-1.28)
-0.86
(-0.74)
2.48
(0.94)
-0.092
(-1.13)
OBS
OTA
-2455
(-1.86)
6.05**
(2.53)
-0.04
(-0.41)
0.007
(1.36)
5.99**
(2.09)
-0.045
(-0.51)
0.02***
(3.39)
6.02**
(2.01)
-0.06
(-0.66)
0.89
(0.71)
6.42**
(2.31)
-0.041
(-0.47)
LP -118903***
(-4.18)
81.9
(1.44)
2.51
(1.09)
-0.29***
(-2.60)
-115.4*
(-1.67)
0.7
(0.33)
0.088
(0.65)
-126.83*
(-1.91)
0.28
(0.14)
21.16
(0.72)
-115.77*
(-1.76)
0.34
(0.17)
C(3) 129.25
(-0.68)
0.43
(1.23)
-0.03*
(-1.83)
0.003***
(3.86)
0.91**
(1.97)
-0.03*
(-1.82)
-0.002**
(-2.27)
1.03**
(2.38)
-0.02
(-1.50)
0.13
(0.71)
1.03**
(2.47)
-0.023*
(-1.73)
BSD -1745
(-0.21)
4.22
(0.28)
1.44**
(2.41)
0.012
(0.38)
8.05
(0.41)
1.46**
(2.51)
-0.03
(-0.65)
9.22
(0.48)
1.47***
(2.60)
0.35
(0.04)
8.84
(0.46)
1.45**
(2.56)
SMD 16.83
(1.06)
-0.002
(-0.06)
-0.003***
(-2.85)
0.0001
(1.07)
0.02
(0.61)
-0.003***
(-2.80)
-0.00004
(-0.56)
0.03
(0.68)
-0.003***
(-2.72)
0.008
(0.47)
0.03
(0.73)
-0.003***
(-2.78)
IR -67.34
(-0.19)
-0.27
(-0.41)
0.06**
(2.23)
-0.0001
(-0.08)
-0.35
(-0.42)
0.06**
(2.31)
-0.0001
(-0.07)
-0.34
(-0.41)
0.057**
(2.31)
-0.04
(-0.10)
-0.35
(-0.42)
0.057**
(2.32)
GDP
G
-544.51
(-1.00)
0.066
(0.07)
0.11***
(2.70)
-0.003
(-1.36)
-0.71
(-0.55)
0.1***
(2.68)
0.001
(0.51)
-0.8
(-0.64)
0.095*
(2.58)
-0.203
(-0.37)
-0.84
(-0.68)
0.097***
(2.64)
Const 6213.68
(0.29)
-9.44
(-0.24)
-2.71*
(-1.73)
-0.024
(-0.28)
-14.93
(-0.29)
-2.7*
(-1.78)
0.08
(0.80)
-17.85
(-0.36)
-2.74*
(-1.85)
1.17
(0.05)
-16.14
(-0.33)
-2.67*
(-1.80)
Obs. 143 143 143 176 176 176 178 178 178 178 178 178
Chi2 188.92 142.19*** 25.54 122.23*** 42.71*** 29.78*** 81.06*** 42.81*** 30.31*** 10.26 45.90*** 29.74***
Notes: T-statistics in ( ); *,**,*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively
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• We examine the relationship between efficiency, risk and capital in Chinese banking industry.
• There is a positive and significant relationship between risk and efficiency.
• The relationship between risk (Z-score) and level of capitalization is negative and significant.
